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The Common Law in South Africa:
Pro Apartheid or Pro Democracy?
BY JEREMY SARKIN °

I. Introduction
The role of the common law in South Africa has been
controversial. Some argue that during the apartheid era the common
law could have protected rights and freedoms, but that it was overruled
by security legislation passed by the parliament. Opponents of this view
argue that South Africa's common law, with its roots in Roman-Dutch
and English law, is a problematic colonial inheritance that has done
little to protect justice and equality. Some have even proposed that the
common law should be codified and South Africanized and that African
customary law, previously derided or ignored, should be taken into
account
This article examines several apartheid-era cases in which the
common law protection of individual rights was at stake, to determine
the extent to which the common law was human rights friendly and the
extent to which the common law is compatible with South Africa's
constitutional dispensation. It then moves on to consider what effect, if
any, the new constitution and bill of rights have had on the common
law. It examines to what extent South Africa's constitutional
dispensation applies horizontally
Lastly, it considers which areas

* Professor and Deputy Dean, Law Faculty, University of the Western Cape;
B.A., LL.B. Natal; LL.M. Harvard University; LL.D. University of the Western Cape;

attorney of the High Court of South Africa; attorney at law in the State of New York,
United States.
1. See N. J. MacNally, Law in a Changing Society: A View from North of the
Limpopo, 105 S. AFR. L.J. 434,436 (1988).
2. See generally Jeremy Sarkin, The Draftingof South Africa's Final Constitution
From a Human Rights Perspective, 42 AM. J. COMp. L. 67 (1999); see also Jeremy
Sarkin, Innovations in the Interim and 1996 South African Constitutions, THE
REVIEW, June, 1998, at 57.
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traditionally excluded from the ambit of a constitution and bill of rights
(the common law and private law) will be affected by the values and
protections afforded by this constitutional dispensation.
II. South Africa's Common Law During the Colonial Period
South Africa has a hybrid common law base made up mainly of
Roman-Dutch and English law.3 The question as to whether the South
African common law is Roman-Dutch or English has been the subject
of much debate.4 Much of South Africa's private law comes from
Roman-Dutch law, whereas English law has had a dramatic impact on
public, procedural and commercial law.
Roman-Dutch law has its origins in the Roman Empire. After the
Empire collapsed, the effect of Roman law waned, only to be revived in
Europe in the twelfth century. By the sixteenth century it was well
incorporated into the law of the Netherlands. The Dutch transported
this blend to the Cape in the seventeenth century when they set up a
refreshment station there! In 1795, the English occupied the Cape to
forestall a French occupation. They handed it back to the Dutch in 1803
but retook it in 1806.
Initially, the English did not make any changes to the RomanDutch law that existed at the Cape of Good Hope. This policy changed
in the 1820s as more British settlers arrived in the colony. However,
several areas of the law remained largely Roman-Dutch. For example,
the law of persons has not received a great deal from English law. One
change that English law did bring about was the 1833 English decree
that from the end of 1834 slavery would no longer be legal at the Cape.
Although the law of property remained largely Roman-Dutch, the
law of succession and contract was heavily influenced by English law.
Similarly, the definitions of various crimes and aspects of delict (tort
law), which contain concepts such as "the reasonable man" and "the

3. African customary law, also applied in the country, has been treated by the legal
system over the years with much derision, and many believe that it has been treated
unfairly and not accorded the deference that it deserves.
4. See, e.g., H. CORDER, JUDGES AT WORK: THE ROLE AND ATLTITUDES OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN APPELLATE JUDICIARY 1910-1950 (1984); C. FORSYTH, IN DANGER FOR
THEIR TALENTS (1985); A. MATHEWS, FREEDOM, STATE SECURITY AND THE RULE OF
LAW (1986) [hereinafter MATHEWS, FREEDOM]; A. SACHS, JUSTICE IN SOuTH AFRICA

(1973).
5. The law imported was that of the province of Holland, as that was where the
majority of directors of the Dutch East India Company came from who set up the
refreshment station at the Cape of Good Hope.
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duty of care," were taken from English law.
IM. Common Law During the Apartheid Era
Many in the legal profession maintained during the apartheid years
that South Africa's Roman-Dutch law was grounded in principles of
fairness and equality, and that when apartheid legislation was repealed,
these principles would once again be the guiding spirit of the law.6 The
apartheid government passed laws that overrode the common law,
rather than rewriting the common law itself. It can, however, be argued
that the weakness of the common law with respect to equality was one
of the factors that enabled the apartheid government to pass repressive
legislation.
It is true that South African law acquired from both Roman-Dutch
and English law a strong sense of justice.7 Both systems incorporate
equality before the law and the advancement of personal freedom by
the means of the perpetuation of fundamental freedoms and rights.8 In
addition, English law incorporates natural justice and impartiality.
The common law creates a duty to uphold equal treatment of all
and invalidates any practice that results in disparate treatment, unless
that practice is authorized by statute or Act of Parliament In Mpanza
v. Minister of Native Affairs,10 the court declared that the right of
personal liberty "is always guarded by court of law as one of the most
cherished possessions of our society." This right, like all other common
law rights, is residual, which means that it exists only insofar as it has not
been denied by an Act of Parliament. Also, where such a statute or Act
is ambiguous, a court may interpret it in favor of individual liberty.

6. See J. Trengrove, Perspectives on the Role ofJudges in a Deeply Divided Society,
in DEMOCRACY AND THE JuDICiARY 125-26 (H. Corder ed., 1989).
7. See A.S. Mathews & R. C. Albino, The Permanence of the Temporary-An

Examination of the 90- and 180- Day Detention Laws, 83 S. AFR. L.J. 16, 37-38 (1966);
JOHN DUGARD, HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 382-83

(1978) [hereinafter DUGARD, SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER]; John Dugard, Using the
Law to PervertJustice, 11 HuM. RTs. 22,25 (1983) [hereinafter Dugard, Using the Law];
see generally H. R. Hahlo & I. A. Maisels, The Rule of Law in South Africa, 52 VA. L.
REV. 13 (1966).
8. See DUGARD, SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 71-72, 382-83,
393; see also A. MATHEWs, LAW, ORDER AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA 308 (1971).
Roman-Dutch Law displays signs of natural law thinking. See generally Cary Miller,

South African Judges as NaturalLawyers-A Roman Dutch Basis?, 90 S.AFR. L.J. 86
(1973).
9. See DUGARD, SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 108.
10. 1946 W.L.D. 225,229.
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Thus, it can be said that the South African common law recognizes that
all people have a right to any and all freedoms not statutorily denied,
and as such, the judiciary must interpret any statute encroaching on
personal liberty "in favorem libertatis."
Indeed, Roman-Dutch law perceives and acknowledges that all
persons are equal under the law, that all are entitled to personal
freedom, that no one person is above the law, and thus, that all persons
are bound by it." Traditionally, in both Roman-Dutch and English
common law, civil liberties are entitled to judicial protection. English
law allows an individual who has been arbitrarily deprived of his liberty
to invoke a writ of "habeus corpus." The Roman-Dutch equivalent is
the "interdictum de homine libero exhibendo." These court-evolved
remedies are designed to protect individuals
from arbitrary
2
governmental invasion of personal freedom.
In a 1916 case, PrincipalImmigration Officer v. Narayansamy,3 the
court declared that all persons within the Union enjoyed the inherent
right to bring an action of habeus corpus pursuant to British and
Roman-Dutch law.
A 1975 case, Wood v. Ondangwa Tribal Authority,4 held that
habeus corpus proceedings could be brought by any person on behalf of
an imprisoned person. Furthermore, the court asserted that habeus
corpus laws "should always be constructed in favour of the liberty of the
citizen."' 5
Despite these decisions, this aspect of South African common law
was pre-empted by statute. During the apartheid era, Parliament
passed a series of laws that denied individuals the remedy of habeus
corpus proceedings as a means to check arbitrary deprivation of
personal liberty. 6 Some of these laws were emergency measures, while
others became ordinary law, despite their origins as emergency-type
legislation.
During this period, the courts were in the main not allies of the
common law principles of natural justice. In fact, they often interpreted
security laws in favor of the government and used ambiguous statutory
language to infer restrictions on personal liberty.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See Dugard, Using the Law, supra note 7, at 38.
See id. at 109.
1916 T.P.D. 274.
1975 (2) SA 294 (A).
Id. at 311.
See DUGARD, SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 109.

1999]

The Common Law in South Africa: Pro Apartheid or Pro Democracy?

5

The most infamous case of this period was Rossouw v. Sachs." In
this case, the court was faced with the question of whether a detained
lawyer was entitled to reading and writing materials in prison. The
court departed from traditional modes of common law interpretation
and upheld legislation forbidding the lawyer these materials. The
importance of this case is further shown by the fact that its rule was
extensively applied in other cases.
Thus, in Goldberg v. Minister of Prisons," the Appellate Division
upheld broad discretion for the Commissioner of Prisons to determine
convicted political prisoners' access to reading matter. The decision was
particularly noteworthy because it demonstrated the court's
unwillingness to interfere with the administrative body's discretion.
Here, Acting Chief Justice Wessels cited the reasoning of the Appellate
Division in Rossouw v. Sachs, in which the court had held that detainees
were entitled only to necessities and not to comforts such as writing
materials. Proceeding from the assumption that prisoners have no
enforceable legal right to receive news, he reached the conclusion that
the Commissioner's decision could not be questioned by a court of law.
Judge Corbett, later Chief Justice, dissented, arguing that a
convicted and sentenced prisoner retains all the basic rights and liberties
of an ordinary citizen except those taken away from him by law. The
judge had no difficulty distinguishing Rossouw v. Sachs on the grounds
that it concerned non-convicted detainees.
In Sobukwe v. Minister of Justice," Robert Sobukwe had been
denied permission to leave the country. He argued that the common
law acknowledged his fundamental right to leave the country, unless
this right was revoked by due process of law. The court rejected this
reasoning and found first, that the common law right was subject to
restrictions, and second, that there was no difference between
restrictions resulting from a sentence by a court of law and
administrative restrictions as found in the Suppression of Communism
Act.
Another natural law principle, the "audi alteram partem rule,"
mandates that before a person is deprived of his or her liberty, that
person has a right to be heard by an administrative body. In Sachs v.
Minister of Justice,20 Sachs argued that his being banned under the
17. 1964 (2) SA 551 (A).
18. 1979 (1) SA 14 (A).
19. 1972 (1) SA 693 (A).
20. 1934 A.D. 11.
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Riotous Assemblies Act and the Criminal Law Act was unlawful and
thus invalid since he had been denied the right to be heard in his own
defense before the banning order was issued. The court found that the
common law right to be heard had been explicitly excluded. It also
found that Parliament may make any encroachment it chooses upon the
life, liberty or property of any individual subject
to its sway, and that it is
21
the function of courts of law to enforce its will.
In Regina v. Ngwevela,2n the audi alterampartem rule was contested
again. In this case, the court held that the fact that other sections of the
act included the right to be heard should not mean that it was implicitly
excluded where other sections were silent. However, the government
quickly remedied this by amending the act so that there was a right to
ask for reasons for the banning order only after it had been issued. The
audi alterampartem rule was thus excluded.
In 1956, in Saliwa v. Minister of Native Affairs, 3 the court again
upheld an individual's right to be heard, only to have Parliament amend
the legislation (in this case the Bantu Administration Act) to exclude
the audi alterampartem rule.
In 1986, in Momoniat & Naidoo v. Minister of Law & Order,2 4 the
court held that the right to be heard was something that Parliament
could not have contemplated ousting. The court nevertheless rejected
the proposition that detainees should be granted a hearing before being
detained. Critics have argued that this was an inconsistent judgment
because the audi alteram partem rule represents a fundamental right
that the court should have excluded only if Parliament had shown a
clear intention to do so.'
The role of the legislature and the courts during the apartheid
years needs to be examined to determine whether the supposed
libertarian strands were upheld or whether it was the common law that
permitted the apartheid system to trample on the rights of the majority.
The conduct of the judiciary prior to the beginning of the 1980 26 has

21. See id. at 36-37.
22. 1954 (1) SA 123 (A).

23. 1956 (2) S.A. 310 (A).
24. 1986 (2) SALR 264 W.L.D (Goldstone, J.).
25. See, e.g., MATHEWS, FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 197.
26. John Dugard has analyzed such conduct. See John Dugard, The Judiciary and
National Security, S. AFR. L.J. 655, 656 (1982). In a study of appointments to sit at
various political trials in the Transvaal, it was found that from 1978 to 1982 there were 25
political trials. These trials were presided over by 12 of the 45 judges of the province.
Analysis revealed that 13 of these cases were heard by only 4 judges. The only common
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been the theme of a number of major studies.27 It is possible to discern a
shift in judicial attitudes from the late 1970s. Some judges developed an
increasing awareness of the predicament they confronted. They
realized that the legal system lacked credibility and legitimacy in the

eyes of the majority because it was perceived as part of the machinery
of oppression. 9
In the early 1980s, some courts, including the Appellate Division,

showed a willingness on occasion to come to the rescue of the
individual. However, the political turmoil that began in 1985, followed

by the 1986 state of emergency, put an end to this new attitude. This
new liberal consciousness was particularly prevalent in the province of
Natal and can be seen in a number of cases.' Pivotal to this increased
liberalism was the appointment to the position of Judge President of the
Natal Provincial Division (NPD) of Mr. Justice A.J. Milne. In a 1983
address to Lawyers for Human Rights, he said:
Judges must bring certain presumptions3to bear in... interpreting
denominator, Dugard observed, was that each of these judges was a member of the more
conservative Pretoria Bar before his elevation to the bench. The fact that so many
judges were Afrikaans may reflect on their conscious or unconscious leanings towards
the Africaner-dominated executive. It is, however, difficult to totally equate language
group affiliation with a pro-executive or pro-individualist leaning. Nevertheless, it is
possible to see why South African judges were in the main conservative and restrained
by their backgrounds in general from playing a more activist position in alleviating some
of the hardships imposed by the repressive legislation.
27. See, eg., CORDER, supra note 3; FORSYTH, supranote 3.
28. See Hoexter Commission Report (1984) and the Human Sciences Research
Council Report of 1985.
29. See DUGARD, SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER, supranote 7, at 487.
30. E.g. Nxasana v. Minister of Justice, 1976 (3) SA 745 (D); In re Dube, 1979 (3)
SA 820 (N); S. v. Meer, 1981 (1) SA 739 (N); Magubane v. Minister of Police, 1982 (3)
SA 542 (N); Ngqulunga v. Minister of Law & Order, 1983 (2) SA 696 (N); S. v.
Khumbisa, 1984 (2) SA 670 (N); Ndabeni v. Minister of Law & Order, 1984 (3) SA 500
(D); Gumede, 1984 (4) SA 915 (N).
31. One of the ways that courts resolved ambiguities in statutes was to look at
common law presumptions. It is, however, important to note that the presumptions
were rebuttable and could be negated by a clause or the wording of a statute. One such
presumption was that the Legislature did not intend to be unreasonable or to cause
injustice. This has been seen in many cases. E.g. Principal Immigration Officer v. Bhula,
1931 A.D. 323, 336-37; R. v Zulu, 1959 (1) SA 263 (A); Minister of Justice v. Hodgson,
1963 (4) SA 535,535-36,539 (T); Van Heerden v. Queen's Hotel Ltd., 1973 (2) SA 14,16
(RAD); S. v. Takaendesa, 1972 (4) SA 72, 77 (RAD); S. v. Weinberg, 1979 (3) SA 89
(A). This presumption has been understood to mean that all enactments should be
taken to affect all people equally and impartially, and not in a disparate and biased way,
unless this is expressly stated or may be implied from the statute. See COCKRAM,
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 112-13 (2d ed.) [hereinafter COCKRAM]; see also S. v.
Werner, 1981 (1) SA 187 (A); Oos-Randse Administrasieraad en 'n Ander v. Rikhoto,
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the legislature's intention. They look at precedent and what can only
be called the general inherited spirit of our laws. It is here that I find
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights particularly interesting
reading. A great many of the fundamental presumptions that guide
our interpretation of what the legislature intended are contained in
the Declaration."

The state, realizing that the courts were not always going to follow
its dictates, thus saw a need for greater statutory intervention in the area
of security laws. As a result, the Internal Security Act33 was enacted
This legislation
following the Rabie 4 Commission of Inquiry."

consolidated most security laws into a single act. The consequence was
to conserve the enormous powers of the executive at the expense of

many of the common law individual rights and liberties. Among other
features, the act enabled the detention of individuals to occur under
separate categories, for different purposes, and for different periods.

During the state of emergency in the 1980s, the courts again had to
determine the relevance of the common law rights of detainees. In the
case of Buthelezi v. Attorney General,6 it was contended that the rules

1983 (3) SA 595 (A); In re Duma, 1983 (4) 469 (N). This presumption has also been
interpreted to be in accord with the notion that the legislature is presumed not to have
resolved to dispossess or encroach on individual vested rights, whether they originate
from a statutory or common law source. See COCKRAM 114; Fredericks v. Stellenbosch
Divisional Council, 1977 (3) SA 113 (C); Komani v. Bantu Affairs Admin. Bd., 1980 (4)
SA 448, 471-72 (A). The presumption has been interpreted as well to signify that penal
statutes will be strictly interpreted to favor an individual whose freedom is in jeopardy.
This was seen in the seminal case of R. v. Sachs, 1953 (1) SA 392 (A). A second
presumption was that where the statute was silent, the principles of natural law were
included. This was seen in Kruse Johnson [1898] 2 Q.B. 91, followed by later South
African cases such as R. v. Ngwevela, 1954 (1) SA 123 (A). A third presumption was
that the law makers intended to modify the existing law no more than necessary. See
COCKRAM 139. This has been seen to mean that the statutes must be interpreted in
accord with the common law and with common law provisions in mind. The statute may,
however, intentionally exclude or alter the common law. See Dhanabakium v.
Subramanian, 1943 A.D. 160, 167. This was seen in R. v. Maphumulo, 1960 (3) SA 793,
799 (N), a case arising during the state of emergency of 1960. A fouth presumption is the
one against the interpretation of a statute that would restrict or remove the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. This has been seen in many cases, the most important of these
being Hurley v. Ministerof Law & Order,1985 (4) SA 709 (D), 1986 (3) SA 568 (A).
32. Justice A.J. Milne, Address to Lawyers for Human Rights (Aug. 6, 1983), in 3 L.
& HUM. RTS. BULL. 48 (1984).
33. Internal Security Act 74 (1982).
34. Chief Justice of South Africa.
35. See generally John Dugard, A Triumph for Executive Power-An Examination
of the Rabie Report and the InternalSecurity Act 74 of 1982, 99 S. AFR. L.J. 589 (1982).
36. 1986 (4) SA 377 (D).
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of natural justice had not been complied with because the person on
whom the detention order was imposed had not been heard and
therefore the notice denying bail was invalid. The decision of S. v.
Baleka37 as to the expendability of the rule of audi alteram partem was
not followed.
Judge Kumleben saw that serious inroads into the rights of the
individual had been made, and therefore the rules of natural justice, as
held in R. v. Ngwevela,38 should apply. Parliament has the right to
exclude the rules of natural justice but where this is not done, either
expressly or impliedly, the courts must enforce the rules of natural
justice as demanded by the common law.39 Although this did not seem

to be a large gain, the imposition of this obligation prior to the issuance
of the detention order ensured that at least some intensive thought
would go into the decision to make use of this provision. The decision,
however, essentially has the effect of restricting the application of the
rules of natural justice. This can be seen in Judge Kumleben's
statement:
It is generally acknowledged that in certain circumstances the rule is
perforce to be restrictively applied, for instance where it would be
contrary to the interests of the state for certain information to be
disclosed .... When all is said and done, the application of the rule in
any particular case involves balancing the interests of the individual
against the interests of the state.4°

Thus, the Buthelezi decision has the effect of restricting the
application of the rules of natural justice. This decision also has a
significant effect on the usage of the maxim expresio unius, exclusio
alterius 4 ' as it restricts the use of the maxim to cases where the result
does not impede the protection of the rights of the individual. The
decision ensures that statutes that infringe on the rights of citizens and
violate conceptions of the protection of human rights are construed
restrictively.
This case adds to the jurisprudence in this area by stating that
although the rules of natural justice are adaptable in their use, there are

37. 1986 (1) SA 361 (T).
38. 1954 (1) SA 123,127 (A).
39. See South Aft. Defence & Aid Fund v. Minister of Justice, 1967 (1) SA 263 (A).
40. Bhuthelezi, 1986 (4) SA at 380.

41. A statute that expresses one of several things thereby implicitly excludes those
that are not mentioned. See Keeley v. Minister of Defence, 1980 (4) SA 695 (T)
(declining to apply the maxim).
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limitations to the usage of these rules. The decision indicates that the
rules can impose varying criteria in different situations42 and can be
adapted to protect fundamental rights.
43
In a state of emergency case, Omar v. Minister of Law & Order,
the court, in a split decision, rejected the argument that it was not the
intention of Parliament to exclude the maxim of audi alteram partem
The court elected, rather, to utilize a restrained approach.' Judge
Vivier adjudged that the Public Safety Act implicitly gives the State
President the power to exclude the maxim. The court declined to give a
constricted reading to the word "hearing," so that it would encompass
oral representations exclusively. 6 This would have been the more
permissive interpretation, as the other types of representations could
then have been procured.
Judge Friedman perceived that no matter how considerable the
powers of the State President were, nothing in the act empowered him
to override the fundamental procedural rule of fairness and of natural
justice.4 ' Accordingly, he found that the ousting of this maxim was
unlawful. Friedman also concluded that the regulation could be set
aside because the State President did not properly consider the problem
when he issued the regulation.' Judge Friedman stated:
It appears ... that the State President was of the opinion that there
may be circumstances where there may be adequate reasons for
ordering the continued detention of a person without giving him a
hearing. It is necessarily implicit in this reasoning that this
consideration cannot apply to all persons who have been detained.
To make a regulation which deprives all detainees of the right to be
heard before the Minister makes an order for their further detention,
when such a procedure may be necessary in the case of only certain
detainees is, to my mind, indicative of the fact that the State President
has not correctly applied his mind to the question of whether audi
alterampattern should, in all, and not merely in exceptional cases, be

42. John Hlophe, Natural Justice: Whether Detainees Have a Right to be Heard
Under the InternalSecurity Act, 104 S. AFR. L.J. 392, 396-7 (1987). Hiophe is now Judge
President of the Cape High Court.
43. 1986 (3) SA 306 (C).
44. Id. at 315.
45. See id. at 311.

46. See id. at 309.
47. See id. at 329.
48. See id. at 329.

1999]

The Common Law in South Africa: Pro Apartheid or Pro Democracy?

11

49

abolished.

Friedman went on to state:
The exercise of an administrative power is assailable in a Court of law
where the person vested with a discretion fails to apply his mind to the
matter. Where he fails to direct his thoughts to the relevant data or
principles or relies on irrelevant considerations, that constitutes a
failure to apply his mind.-

Such statements from the minority opinion show that some judges
were then more willing to interpret the common law in favour of the
rights of the individual.
In Omar v. Minister of Law & Order, Fani v. Minister of Law &
Order,and State Presidentv. Cameron51 a number of decisions came on
appeal to the Appellate Division for resolution. This judgment
represented a major setback for the human rights cause. This was the
first opportunity that the Appellate Division had to react to the new
security regulations and their infringement of fundamental common law
rights. 2 The Appellate Division responded abysmally. All the victories
in the courts of the provincial divisions were nullified by this one
The court, without regard to statutory
nonchalant decision.
presumptions or rules of interpretation, accepted the argument that
fundamental common law rights were excluded in the absence of an
indication by the statute that they be retained. A minority decision
stressed that the audi alteram partem is presumed
53 to be present unless
it.
eliminate
to
intention
unmistakable
an
is
there
To conclude, in the majority of cases during the apartheid era,
Parliament rode roughshod over the common law rights to individual
liberty. ' The courts generally served as a rubber stamp for the
legislature as they upheld and sanctioned government encroachment on
personal freedom.
Therefore, while it is obvious that the common law had strands that
were compatible with human rights, the statutory laws of apartheid in
South Africa overwhelmed the common law. Consequently, the
49. Id at 329.
50. Id. at 330.
51. 1987 (3) SA 859 (A).
52. See John Dugard, Omar: Supportfor Wacks's Ideas on the JudicialProcess?, 3 S.
AFR. J. HuM. RTs. 295,297 (1987).
53. 1987 (3) SA at 906.
54. See generally R. Cowling, M.G., Judges and the Protection of Human Rights in
South Africa: Articulatingthe InarticulatePremise, 3 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 177 (1987).

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 23:1

residual common law rights were of minimal effect.

IV. The Conunon Law in the Constitutional Era
South Africa, in its democratic era, has had two constitutions: an
interim and a final constitution. The interim justiciable constitution
entered into force on April 27, 1994,55 while the final constitution
became law in February of 1997.
A. The Interim Constitution
The interim constitution contained a chapter on fundamental
rights. As a result of compromise, the chapter contained only those
fundamental rights that negotiators could agree warranted protection
during the transitional period before a final constitution was adopted.
Constitutional supremacy, rather than parliamentary supremacy,
was established by section 4:
This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic and any
law or act inconsistent with its provisions shall, unless otherwise
provided expressly or by necessary implication in this Constitution, be
of no force and effect to the extent of the inconsistency.
The Constitutional Court was the final forum for all matters
relating to the constitution and all other laws.' 6 Parliament did not have
free reign to make laws as was previously the case.
Other sections further entrenched the supremacy of rights
enumerated in the constitution over other law and administrative
actions. Thus, section 7(2) stated that "[t]his Chapter shall apply to all
law in force and all administrative decisions taken and acts performed
during the period of operation of this Constitution."
Similarly, section 33(2) stated that "[n]o law, whether a rule of the
common law, customary law or legislation, shall limit any right
entrenched in this chapter."
Thus all law, including legislation and the common law, was
covered by this provision. However, there was debate57 about whether
the chapter had horizontal effect58 and, thus, whether it governed
55. See § 251 of Transitional Constitution Act 200 of 1993.
56. S. AFR. CONST. of 1994

§ 98(2).

57. See, e.g., A.J. Van der Walt, Tradition on Trial: A CriticalAnalysis of the CivilLaw Traditionin South African PropertyLaw, 11 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 169 (1995).
58. Bills of rights are usually vertical in that they operate against the state. Thus, a
citizen can bring an action against the state where the state has transgressed his or her
rights. Usually this amounts to a challenge to a law or administrative act by the
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private law relationships.59 While the bill was clearly vertical in ambit,
there were arguments for its horizontal application. A number of
sections (for example, section 7(2) quoted above) could have been
interpreted to include all law, including private law, in the operation of
the Bill of Rights.
However, a section indicating the possible non-horizontal
application of the bill was section 7(1), which stated that "[t]his Chapter
shall bind all legislative and executive organs of state at all levels of
government." The argument was that because section 7(1) was silent on
the judiciary, the law emanating from this branch of government was
not subject to the operation of the chapter.6° If this was the case, then
private law was considered to be outside the constitutional arena. 1
There were two major reasons why the issue of the extent to which
the constitution would operate horizontally was left open in the interim
constitution. The first was that the negotiators of the interim
constitution could not agree whether that constitution should apply
horizontally. The second was that some negotiators wanted the interim
constitution to be a minimalist document, arguing that only elected
politicians drawing up the final constitution should determine what
rights ought to be protected. Ultimately, the constitution's ambivalence
on the issue of general horizontal application left it up to the courts to
decide which of the provisions of the Bill of Rights should be applied
horizontally.
Nevertheless, the interim constitution stated that the aims and
general thrust of the Bill of Rights were to be incorporated into all
branches of the law. Section 35(3) directed that when performing the
"interpretation of any law and the application and development of the
common law and customary law, a court shall have due regard to the
spirit, purport and objects of this Chapter."62 Thus, even though there

legislature or the executive. Horizontal application means that the bill could be invoked
by one private individual against another. Thus, if the bill applied horizontally, state

action would not be necessary to maintain an action. All law, including private law,
could be tested against the provisions of such a bill of rights.

59. See generally M. Brassey, Labour Relations Under the New Constitution, 10 S.
AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 183 (1994).
60. See L M. DU PLESSIS & H. CORDER, UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA'S
TRANSmONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 112 (1994).
61. See generally J.M. Burchell, 20 BuswESsMAN's LAW 155, 175 (1991); J.M.
BURCHELL, PRINCIPLES OF DELICr

13 (1994); J. NEETHLING

(1994).
62. S. AFR. CONST. of 1994 § 35(3).

ET AL., LAW OF DELICr
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was debate about whether there was direct horizontal application,'
section 35(3) ensured the indirect application of the chapter to private
law. 4
An interesting question is what the result would be if the legislature
simply repealed certain statutes without replacing them. Would the
common law revive? In such a situation, section 12(2) of the
Interpretation Act65 would play a part. Section 12(2) provides, "Where
a law repeals any other law, then unless the contrary intention appears,
the repeal shall not ...
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the
time at which the repeal takes effect."
Thus, the intention of the legislature is decisive in determining
whether or not a previous law revives. However, whether this section
includes the non-revival of the common law depends on the meaning
given to the word "anything." Steyn is of the opinion that the common
law might revive if a statute is repealed.66 Steyn cites Tiffin v. Cillier 67 in
this regard, where the court held that the word "anything" was "wide
enough to include a rule of the Common Law" '' but expressed some
"doubt however as to the correctness of that view. 8
Elucidating Steyn's view, Devenish points out that section 12(2)(a)
applies only where one law repeals another.69 However, this does not
take the matter further as the repeal of a law would occur either when a
later law on the same subject overrode it by implication or Parliament
passed a law that explicitly repealed it. Thus, if Parliament simply
repealed an act, nothing would exist.
As far as the striking down of a law is concerned, the matter is
unclear. In Du Plessisv. De Klerk,70 the court held as follows:
The operation of a declaration of invalidity of a law ("wet") is dealt
with in subsection (6), but section 98 nowhere provides for a
declaration that a rule of common law is invalid. Such a declaration
would be highly unusual, and would give rise to much difficulty. If a

63. The interim constitution offers less guidance as to direct horizontal application.
64. See D. Visser, The Future of the Law of Delict (1994) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the author).
65. Interpretation Act 33 of 1957.
66. See L.C. STEYN, UrrLEG VAN WETrE 176 (1981). However, it was stated in S. v.

Kruger, 1976 (3) SA 290, that the common law on abortion was repealed by the passing
of the Abortion and Sterilisation Act 2 of 1975.
67. 1925 O.P.D. 23.
68. Id. at 26.
69. See G. DEVENISH, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 254 (1992).
70. 1996 (3) SALR 850 (CC).
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statute, including one embodying a private law rule, is struck down,
the previous common law (or earlier statute law) is presumably
restored. But what would result from holding a rule of the common
law to be unconstitutional? What would follow
7 is that the relevant
common law would require to be reformulated. '
It does, however, seem that the Constitutional Court and even
other courts would be reluctant to strike down the common law. In this
regard, Justice Kentridge stated:
For present purposes the point is that these are not choices which this
court can or ought to make. They are choices which require
consideration perhaps on a case by case basis by the common law
courts. The common law, it is often said, is developed on an
incremental basis. Certainly
it has not been developed by the process
'
of "striking down."

In Gardener v. Whitaker,7 the Constitutional Court held that
while the Bill of Rights was aimed at vertical application, it was not
exclusively so. The court also held that the constitution should not be
limited to the sphere of public law because the foundation of society
is to be found in the Bill of Rights, which would be undermined if
ignored in private law relationships. The court further held that the
highest norms of the constitution should penetrate every aspect of
private law relationships and therefore the horizontal/vertical
application should lose its traditional significance. The court
reiterated that the constitution is concerned with transforming South
African society by way of providing a legal system that is concerned
with openness, accountability, human rights, democracy and
reconstruction and reconciliation and therefore, in some cases, this
Bill of Rights must operate in the private law sphere. The court
furthermore pointed out that it was not possible to provide an answer
to the question of the extent to which horizontal application applies
because the question can only be answered with the concrete
situation of each individual case. The court also stated that indirect
application of the Bill of Rights should be performed by the other
courts so that "a court which has regard to the dictates of § 35(3)IC does
not merely develop common law in abstracto: it must apply the laws
found to the case before it."74 The court maintained, however, that it
71.
7273.
74.

a
Id
1996 (4) SA 337 (CC); 1996 (6) BCLR 775 (CC).
Id.
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retained an oversight role.5
In Shabalala v. Attorney General of the Transvaal,76 the
prosecutor's docket privilege in the common law was found to be
unconstitutional. This case indicates the power of the courts to reshape
the common law. Here, Justice Mahomed explained that the interim
constitution "retains from the past only what is defensible and
represents a radical and decisive break from that part of the past which
is unacceptable. It constitutes a decisive break from a culture of
apartheid and racism to a constitutionally protected culture of openness
and democracy."77
The critical case determining the applicability of horizontality to
the interim constitution was Du Plessis v. De Klerk.8 In that case, the
Constitutional Court had to determine whether the Bill of Rights of the
interim constitution was applicable to legal relationships between
private parties. The case raised the issue of whether one private party
could enforce the free speech guarantees of the constitution against
another private party. In Du Plessis,individuals sued the Pretoria News
and its publisher, editor, and a reporter for defamation in connection
with a series of articles accusing certain private citizens of financing the
UNITA forces in the Angolan civil war. The defendants argued that
they were protected by the free speech provision of the Bill of Rights.
The court declined to apply the protections of the Bill of Rights to
wholly private delicts such as defamation.
The majority of the court held that the Bill of Rights is only
indirectly horizontal. The court made this determination in regard to
the entire Bill of Rights, rather than to any specific provision. It
adopted an all-or-nothing approach, holding that "Chapter 3 does not
have a general horizontal application." The court stated:
Traditionally bills of rights have sought to strike a balance between
governmental power and individual liberty and to constitute a
protection against state tyranny.

Conventionally fundamental

rights and freedoms are protected against State Action only.
Where horizontal protection occurs, it is invariably provided in
express terms. Nowhere does the constitution contain an explicit
provision that the fundamental rights provisions have horizontal
effect between private citizens. The terms in which § 7(1) and §

75.
76.
77.
78.

See id.
1996 (1) SALR 725 (CC); 1995 (12) BCLR 1593 (CC).
1996 (1) SALR at 740.
1996 (6) BCLR752 (CC).
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4(2) are framed indicate the contrary. Furthermore § 33(4) would
be unnecessary if Ch[apter] 3 had horizontal effect. It is also
inconceivable that the framers intended the whole body of Private
Law to become unsettled - as would be the consequence of
horizontal application.79
The decision in Du Plessis contrasted with the decisions from lower
courts, which held that some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights were
capable of horizontal application. '
In making its decision, the
Constitutional Court surveyed foreign case law and concluded that
there was no universal answer to the problem of vertical and horizontal
application of a bill of rights. After analyzing case law from the United
States, Canada and Germany, the court expressed its comparative
approval of the German model of indirect horizontal application. The
court's endorsement of the German model resulted from the fact that
both Germany's and South Africa's constitutions divide constitutional
jurisdiction between different appellate courts depending on the issue
presented for review. The court determined that the applicability of
constitutional values to private conduct ought to be determined
incrementally by the common law.
The majority of the court found that the Bill of Rights could not be
applied directly to the common law in actions between private parties,
but left open the question of whether there were particular provisions of
the Chapter that could be so applied. In terms of section 35(3), courts
were obliged, in the application and development of the common law,
to show due regard for the spirit, purpose and objects of Chapter 3. The
majority held that it was the task of the Supreme Court, including the
Appellate Division, to apply and develop the common law in the
manner required by section 35(3).
Justices Madala and Kriegler dissented. They argued that the
horizontal question hinged upon whether disadvantaged groups could
demand equal treatment in both public and private spheres.
Thus, the interim constitution applied vertically only. The courts
were bound to apply the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights
in their interpretation of the common law.
B. The Final Constitution
The Bill of Rights contained in the final constitution also has a
79. Id.

80. See Delisa Futch, Du Plessis vs. De Klerk: South Africa's Bill of Rights and the
Issue of HorizontalApplication,22 N.C. J. INT'LL. & COM. REG. 1009,1027 (1997).
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section that requires the courts, when developing the common law, to
promote the spirit, purpose and objects of the Bill of Rights."' The Bill
of Rights also improves on the interim Bill of Rights in some respects.
Significantly, the final constitution and Bill of Rights not only bind
the state (vertical application) but, to the extent that the nature of the
right at issue permits, they also bind private and juristic persons. The
relevant provision is section 8(2) of the final constitution, which states:
"A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if,
and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of
the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right."
The Bill of Rights now binds the legislature, the executive, the
judiciary and all organs of state. Under the interim constitution the
term "judiciary" was left out. Thus all laws and the acts of private
individuals are now included within the ambit of the constitution and
Bill of Rights. These provisions made the Du Plessis decision lose most
of its force, but kept intact the Du Plessis analysis of the indirect
horizontal application.
Which rights are to be included in the scope of horizontality have
yet to be determined. However, certain sections contain provisions that
make them likely to fall within this scope. For instance, section 9(4)
states that no person may discriminate directly or indirectly against
anyone on one or more grounds listed in section 9(3). It thus seems that
the right not to be unfairly discriminated against will always apply to
private conduct. In addition, section 12(1)(c) states that the right to
freedom and security of the person includes the right "to be free from
all forms of violence from either public or private sources."
The uncertainty on the precise scope of rights is of some concern.
At a minimum, however, the clause will effectively ensure that the
common law is developed in line with the Bill of Rights, which is vital
for the development of a democracy based on human rights." As
Justice Mohamed noted in Du Plessis v. de Klerk:
The common law is not to be trapped within the limitations of its past.
It needs not to be interpreted in conditions of social and constitutional
ossification. It needs to be revisited and revitalized with the spirit of
81. S. AFR. CONST. of 1997 § 39(2) ("When interpreting any legislation, and when
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.").
82. See generally Jeremy Sarkin, Problems and Challenges Facing South Africa's
Constitutional Court: An Evaluation of its Decisions on Capital and Corporal
Punishment,113 S. AER. L.J. 71 (1996); Jeremy Sarkin, The Development of a Human
Rights Culturein South Africa, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 628 (1998).
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the constitutional values defined in Chapter 3 of the Constitution and
with full regard to the purport and objects of that Chapter."
Similar sentiments were expressed in S. v. Makwanyane,8 S. v.
Mhlungu,u and Shabalalav. Attorney-Generalof the Transvaal.6
The question of the scope of rights would arise, for example, if the
courts examined whether corporal punishment is permissible in the
homey At present, the imposing of corporal punishment in homes is
governed by the common law.' The state can, however, bring the
infliction of this type of punishment within the direct protection of the
rights contained in the Bill of Rights if it enacts legislation on the issue.
This was done for corporal punishment in schools, both state and
independent, which was prohibited by the National Education Policy
Act and the South African Schools Act. These acts were passed by
Parliament in 1995 and 1996, respectively.' More recently, Parliament
passed the Abolition of Corporal Punishment Act. This act removed
those legal provisions sanctioning judicial corporal punishment by
courts, including traditional courts.
The extent to which the constitution and Bill of Rights will
transform the common law has yet to be determined. Generally
speaking, most South African private law is common law as there has
not been a great deal of statutory intervention in these areas of the law.
One area that has seen development since 1994 is the law relating
to defamation. There have been, however, conflicting approaches to
defamation by the courts since the constitution came into force. These
conflicts were resolved in NationalMedia v. Bogoshi when the court
examined the issues of strict liability and media or political privilege. In

83. 1996 (3)SALR 850 (CC).
84. 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC).
85. 1995 (3) SALR 867 (CC).
86. 1996 (1) SALR 725 (CC); 1995 (12) BCLR 1593 (CC).
87. Sweden banned the infliction of corporal punishment on children by their
parents in 1979. See generally D. Olson, The Swedish Ban of CorporalPunishment,
BYU L. REv. 447 (1984).
88. The South African common law dealing with the power of chastisement is
relevant. According to the common law, disciplinary competence is not confined to
parents, but vests also in teachers and others in loco parentis. Those in loco parentis are
those who have custody and control of children. However, it is not clear whether
authorities in a children's home have an original power of chastisement or derive their
power from their position in loco parentis.
89. These laws are being contested in the courts at present by a group of religious
schools.

90. 1998 (4) SALR 1196 (SA).
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that decision, the court abolished strict liability of the press, reasoning
that such liability was incorrect, rather than that such liability conflicted
with the constitution. Again, as with other decisions, the court ignored
the effect of the constitution on the common law. The reason for this is
that a perception exists that the constitution (and its reach) is a public
law matter. This can be seen in various cases. For example, in National
Media Ltd. v. Jooste,91 when the Appellate Division examined the right
to privacy and the invasion thereof in the delictual context, no reference
was made at all to the constitution.
The Supreme Court of Appeal's finding in the 1998 case of S. v.
Jackson7 is also relevant to a discussion of the role of the constitution in
the reform of the common law. It is a critical case relating to gender
equality and the common law. The case dealt with an appeal from a
conviction of rape. A key question before the court was the
applicability of the cautionary rule in sexual assault cases. The holding
of the court, according to Judge Olivier writing for the majority, was
that the rule "in sexual assault cases is based on irrational and out dated
perception. It unjustly stereotypes complainants in sexual assault cases
(overwhelmingly women) as particularly unreliable." '9 The court held
that the rule should not be applied in sexual cases only but that "the
evidence in a particular case may call for a cautionary approach, but
'
that is a far cry from the application of a general cautionary rule."94
This holding by the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned a rule of
the common law that was imposed regularly by courts. While the court
held the rule no longer applicable, it did not specifically mention the
common law or even that the rule had been regularly applied for years.
Surprisingly, no mention was even made of the constitution or its effect
on the judgement. In addition, no reference was made to gender
equality.
This case is pertinent to the transformation of the judiciary,
however.
Particularly relevant is Judge Oliver's background.
Previously, he had been criticized in an interview for a seat on the
Constitutional Court, and in the media, for sexist comments he had
made in a rape case. This almost certainly affected his judgment in S. v.
Jackson, and may have influenced either his selection or his request to
write the opinion in the case. Where courts have discussed the
91.
92.
93.
94.

1996 (3) SALR 262 (A).
1998 (1) SACR 470 (A).
Id. at 476.

Id.
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constitution in relation to the common law, they have mostly found that
the common law reflects the values contained in the constitution.
This reluctance to drastically transform the common law by using
the constitution can also be seen in decisions of the Constitutional
Court. For example, in Fose v. Minister of Safety and Security, the
Court noted that "[t]he radical adaptation of our common law is not
called for by the provisions of the Constitution [and] ...in many cases
the common law requires no more than a slight modification to create
the degree of harmony required between itself and the Constitution.""
Thus, the courts have been reluctant to bring constitutional values
into decision making in the private law sphere. This is true even of the
Constitutional Court. In Du Plessis,Justice Ackerman stated:
Direct application of the Chapter 3 rights... will cast onto the
Constitutional Court the formidable task of reforming the private
common law of this country, a consequence which could not have
been intended by the drafters. It turns the Constitution, contrary to
the historical evolution of constitutional individual rights protection,
also into a code of obligations for private individuals, with no
indication in the Constitution as to how clashes between the rights
and duties are to be resolved, or how clashing rights are to be
balanced; section 33(1)IC was clearly not designed and is quite
inappropriate for this purpose. It would also be undesirable in a
broader constitutional sense, pre-empting in many cases Parliament's
role of reforming the common law by ordinary legislation.96
In the same case, Justice Sachs stated:
A major advantage of following the indirect approach and allowing
the Appellate Division to develop the common law in keeping with
the soul of the Constitution, is that the decisions of that court would
not have the entrenched permanence automatically resulting from our
judgments. Parliament could, following normal procedures, opt for
amending or even abrogating Appellate Division decisions, provided
that it legislated within the range of possibilities permitted by Chapter
31C. Such alterations, however, would be severely limited in relation
to determinations by our Court, where only a constitutional
amendment, or at most, cautious navigation by Parliament around the
prescriptive rocks of our judgments, could produce the change.9'
Justice Ackerman similarly noted:

95. 1996 (2) BCLR 232 (CC).
96. 1996 (3)SALR 850 (CC).
97. Id.

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 23:1

The common law of this country has, in the past, proved to be flexible
and adaptable, and I am confident that it can also meet this new
constitutional mandate.98
C. How Will the Common Law Be Reformed in Reality?
Although the courts will probably make slight modifications to the
common law in the light of the constitution, it is unlikely that they will
play a major role. This is because they perceive the constitution as a
public law matter. In addition, the courts are currently severely
overburdened. It seems more probable that the transformation of
South Africa's private law will occur through parliamentary enactment
rather than by way of the courts. Accordingly, lacunae, problems, and
the like will be remedied by statute rather than by judicial involvement.
Thus, while the courts must reconsider common law rules in light of the
Constitution, 9 it seems likely that the development of the common law
is more likely to occur by way of legislative involvement.
If Parliament alone is to reform the common law, the
Constitutional Court needs to play a crucial role in ensuring that
reforms are consistent with constitutional rights. How vigorously the
court will examine state legislation and action remains, however, a
debatable point. The court has stated that its role
is not to "second guess" the executive or legislative branches of
government or interfere with affairs that are properly their concern.
We have also made it clear that we will not look at the Constitution
narrowly. Our task is to give meaning to the Constitution and, where
possible, to do so in ways which are consistent with its underlying

purposes and are not detrimental to effective government.'0°
In the 1997 case Soobramoney v. Minister of Health of KwazuluNatal,1" the Constitutional Court showed judicial restraint in this regard.
Mr Soobramoney was a diabetic who also suffered from heart disease
and kidney failure. He wished to be admitted to the dialysis program at
a public hospital in Kwazulu-Natal but was told that he did not meet the

98. Id.
99. See Rivett-Carnac v. Wiggins, 1997 (4) BCLR 562 (C); Hix Networking
Technologies v. System Publishers Ltd., 1997 (1) SALR 391 (A) ("That it is this Court's
duty to develop the common law, in the manner laid down in the Constitution, is
clear....").
100. Western Cape Executive Council v. President of the Republic of S. Afr., 1995
(4) SA 877 (CC); 1995 (10) BCLR 1289 (CC).
101. 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC).
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entry requirements. He was told that state hospitals suffer from a
shortage of dialysis machines and staff and that only those patients who
could be cured in a short period or those who were eligible for a
transplant would be admitted. Soobramoney sought relief in court on
the basis that section 27(3) of the constitution provides that no one may
be refused emergency medical treatment and that section 11 protects
the right to life.
The Constitutional Court held unanimously that the right not to be
refused emergency medical treatment applies when a person suffers a
sudden catastrophe that calls for immediate medical attention. The
court found that because Soobramoney had chronic renal failure and
would require dialysis several times a week, his case was not an
emergency.
The court (narrowly and wrongly, it is contended) did not examine
whether the state had too few machines or whether the budget was
being spent in the best possible manner. Rather, the court found that
such policies were best left to those with specialized knowledge at a
functional level. The court was hesitant to "interfere with rational
decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and 2medical
authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such matters."'
Judge Sachs agreed with this view of the court's review function.
"Courts are not the proper place to resolve the agonizing personal and
medical problems that underlie these choices. Important though our
review functions are, there are areas where institutional incapacity and
appropriate constitutional modesty require us to be especially
cautious."1' 3

This stands in contrast to earlier comments of the court regarding
socio-economic rights. In Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional
Assembly in re Certificationof the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa,"°4 the court had to certify the compliance of the final constitution
with the constitutional principles contained in the interim constitution.
Objections to certification were made by various groups and individuals.
Defending the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the constitution the
court noted:
The second objection was that the inclusion of these rights ... is
inconsistent with the separation of powers ... because the judiciary

would have to encroach upon the proper terrain of the Legislature
102. Id.
103. Id
104. 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC).
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and Executive. In particular the objectors argued it would result in
the courts dictating to the government how the budget should be
allocated. It is true that the inclusion of socio-economic rights may
result in courts making orders which have direct implications for
budgetary matters. However, even when a court enforces civil and
political rights such as equality, freedom of speech and the right to a
fair trial, the order it makes will often have such implications. A court
may require the provision of legal aid, or the extension of State
benefits to a class of people who formerly were not beneficiaries of
such benefits. In our view, it cannot be said that by including socioeconomic rights within a bill of rights, a task is conferred upon the
Courts so different from that ordinarily conferred upon them by a bill
of rights that it can result in a breach of the separation of powers.'05
Thus, while the court was willing to defend the inclusion of these
rights in the constitution by the politicians and defend the possibility of
the courts' concerning themselves with budgetary issues when
necessary, the court would not do so itself.
While the result in Soobramoney can, to some extent, be
understood by the ramifications it might have had, the decision
highlights the limited role the court sees for itself. The court indicates in
this case, as it has in others, that as far as some questions are concerned
it will play a hands-off role. This is highly problematic because a
dynamic and robust court is necessary to find a balance in a country
undergoing transition.
This case, and similar cases in the past, indicate that the
Constitutional Court will not be robust in its determination of issues
that it believes to be in the domain of the state."° Thus, it seems that the
court will give a great deal of latitude to Parliament.

V. Conclusion
The implication of the constitution's having little or no real effect
on the common law is enormous. This is because most of the relations
between individuals remain within the realm of private law. If this
branch of the law remains beyond the reach of the constitution, it will
continue, for example, "to protect the right of private persons
substantially to perpetuate such unfairness by entering into contracts or
making dispositions subject to the condition that such land is not sold to

105. Id.

106. See generally Jeremy Sarkin, The Constitutional Court's Decision on Legal
Representation:S v. Vermaas and S v. Du Plessis,12 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTs. 55 (1995).
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or occupied by Blacks."1" This is relevant because the cases handed
down so far by the courts, including the Constitutional Court, have not
grappled with the legacy of apartheid or the socio-economic deprivation
that continues to plague the majority of South Africans. This is
surprising given the government's rhetorical emphasis on socioeconomic issues and the fierce debates about including socio-economic
issues in the constitution.
It is also relevant that private law still provides protections for
those who discriminate. Because private law remains beyond the
protection afforded by the constitution, discrimination by one individual
against another is still permissible. It is surprising that during the tenure
of the first democratic government, no legislation was introduced to
forbid discrimination in, for example, housing sales and rentals or use of
amenities.
Only recently has anti-discrimination legislation been enacted.
This legislation was finally enacted by Parliament in a rush to meet a
constitutional deadline. In short, too little has been done by Parliament
and the courts to affect the private lives of the majority of South
Africa's citizens.
The Constitutional Court has not worked to ensure that more
people are affected by the principles in the constitution. First, access to
the court is complex and expensive. Very few cases reach the court and
those that do deal with very narrow points of law. The role of the
Constitutional Court, far from being robust and interventionist, has
been very limited. It has often attempted to avoid dealing with issues of
major importance by invoking procedural rules and approaches that
have relevance only to a particular case or to a restricted area of law.
While this approach can be understood in the context of the court's not
wanting to tie itself to positions that might affect future decisions, this
approach ensures that its decisions have a limited impact.
Second, while the court complains that the media inadequately
reports on its judgments, the court does little to ensure that its decisions
are understood. The court also refers to almost no writings of South
African academics. Thus, no debate is engendered.
The Constitutional Court is also set on encouraging other courts to
play an important role in determining constitutional issues that come
before them. Although this ensures the inclusion of many courts in the
107. Du Plessis, 1996 (3) SALR 850 (Mohamed, J.). The recent enactment of the
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 will, it is
hoped, negate this to some degree.
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constitutional process, it is unfortunate that the Constitutional Court is
not playing a more dynamic role by providing guidance and establishing
principles for application by other courts.
The Constitutional Court has also shown that it is unwilling to
strike down legislation enacted by South Africa's post-apartheid
Parliament. This is most visible in the recent bail decision of the
Constitutional Court where the court again indicated its reluctance to
interfere with legislation enacted by Parliament.
In fact, the
Constitutional Court in its first four years did not strike down a postapartheid parliamentary enactment. 8 In addition, the court has
adopted a cautious approach in many of its decisions. This approach is
visible, for example, in its task of certifying the final constitution, 9
when it interpreted the matter narrowly and displayed its reluctance to
interfere with or reopen carefully crafted political compromises.

108. The only exception to this is possibly the sending back of the final constitution to
the Constitutional Assembly for limited reworking.
109. For more detail on the role of the court with regard to political matters and with
regard to certification, see Jeremy Sarkin, The PoliticalRole of the ConstitutionalCourt,
114 S. AFR. L.J. 134 (1997).

